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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
W I L L I A M WA^
WELLWOOP
Plaintiff- A ppellant,
-vsJ O H N W. T U R N E R , Past Warden,
and S A M U E L W . S M I T H , Present
Warden, Utah State Prison, < I al
Defendant-Respondev /.

B R I E F ()l

"ase No.
i.> > 0

RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF
T H E N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
This is an appeal from a denial of petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 72, Part I X of Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT
Petition for writ of habeas corpus was heard beDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

fore the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, District Court of Salt Lake County, on September 27,
1973, in Case No. 210613. Petition was denied October
9, 1973.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks that the lower court's decision
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 14, 1971, at approximately 9:00 p.m.,
two men robbed Joe's Husky Station at 2100 South
and Third East in Salt Lake City (T. 5,6). One of the
men, described by the victim Robert A. Barney as Caucasian, about thirty, five feet, eight inches in height,
weight around 150 to 175 pounds, receding hairline,
long hair, long sideburns, and drooping mustache (T.
7), held a distinctive sawed-off shotgun (T. 21,22)
with an unusual pistol grip to the midsection of the
victim, while the other man, described as Caucasian,
about thirty, fairly large (250 pounds), six foot four,
receding hairline, long sideburns, big drooping mustache
(T. 10-14), opened the service station cash box and took
money, a credit card, belonging to Mortensen Furniture, and other valuables (T. 18). The two men escaped
in a light colored automobile (T. 84).
On October 16, 1971, police officers, led by an
informant familiar with the petitioner-appellant's activities, went to a "motorcycle club" located at First West
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3
and Fifth South. There the informant pointed out petitioner-appellants as the robbers of Joe's Husky Station.
Police officers, noting that petitioners closely fit the
description of the robbers as given by the victim and
noting a car parked behind the "club house" fitting the
description of the getaway car, arrested petitioners without a warrant. Incident and contemporaneous with this
arrest, police officers searched the room in which petitioner Harris was found and also the room in which petitioner Wellwood was found (T. 58). In the latter room,
officers found a distinctive sawed-off shotgun with a
pistol grip. Officers also obtained from petitioner Harris
a Husky Oil Company credit card belonging to Mortensen Furniture.
Petitioners were tried January 12 and 13, 1972,
before a jury which found them guilty of robbery. Each
were sentenced to an indeterminate term provided by
law.
Counsel for petitioners filed notice of appeal from
the trial court decision. Subsequently, petitioners voluntarily elected to forego the appeal; in return, Case Nos.
23869, 23870, and 23871, were dismissed against them.
On September 27, 1973, a full hearing was given
for petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On
October 9, 1973, the petition was denied. On November
21, 1973, a notice of appeal from the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed with this Court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E W R I T OF H A B E A S CORPUS IS
NOT A P R O P E R R E M E D Y U N D E R
T H E F A C T S O F T H I S CASE.
Appellant alleges several issues in his brief for
which he seeks review. All these issues were known to
petitioner at the time of his commitment to the Utah
State Prison, yet he voluntarily elected to forego the
appeal in exchange for dismissal of three cases against
him. According to Utah law, the proper procedure
should have been to appeal his sentence.
Appellant is trying to use the writ of habeas corpus
as a means of appeallate review. This is not the purpose
for which the writ was established. In Bryant v. Turner,
19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967), this Court held:
"The writ is, as our rules describe it, an
extraordinary writ,, to be used to protect one
who is restrained of his liberty where there
exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the
requirements of the law have been so ignored
or distorted that the party is substantially and
effectively denied what is included in the term
'due process of law,' or where some other circumstances exists that it would be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction."
Id. at 286-287, 122, 123.
When the same facts alleged in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus are known to the petitioner at the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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time of his judgment, his proper remedy is not a writ.
In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968
(1968), the petitioner contended that he was denied the
right to counsel, and that he did not understand the
consequences of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court
of Utah held that the petitioner was not entitled to the
habeas corpus remedy:
"If the contention of error is something
which is known or should be known to the party
at the time the judgment was entered, it must
be reviewed in the manner and within the time
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or
the judgment becomes final and is not subject
to further attack, except in some such unusual
circumstances as we have mentioned above.
Were it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure governing appeals and limitations of
time specified therein would be rendered impotent." Id. at 98-99, 969.
In Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d
343 (1970), the petitioner charged with the crime of
robbery withdrew his plea of not guilty, plead guilty
and did not appeal from the judgment and sentence.
Instead he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging
that at the time of his change of plea, he was not advised
of the consequences of his plea of guilty, and that his
counsel inadequately defended him. The Utah Supreme
Court held that the writ of habeas corpus could not be
used as a means of appellate review, and affirmed denial of the writ.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the case of Zumbrunnen v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d
428, 497 P.2d 34 (1972), the defendant plead guilty to
burglary upon dismissal of two similar charges. H e petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after his time for
appeal had expired claiming (1) his plea was involuntary and unintelligent and (2) his counsel was incompetent. This Court held that both points could have been
argued on a regular appeal, and that the writ of habeas
corpus may not be used as a substitute for such appeal.
In the present case, the defendant's attorney, who
the lower court described as "adequate, if not excellent,"
filed a timely notice of appeal following the defendant's
conviction. Subsequently the defendant voluntarily
elected to forego the appeal in return for the dismissal
of Case Nos. 23869, 23870, and 23871, against him.
Defendant now seeks to reap the benefits of his bargain
and dismiss its disadvantages.
For the above reasons, the petition for writ of
habeas corpus in this case is an improper remedy, and
the decision below should be affirmed.
POINT II
T H E A P P E A L WAS NOT F I L E D
WITHIN THE TIME STIPULATED
W I T H I N R U L E 73(a) O F T H E U T A H
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
SHOULD THEREFORE
BE DISMISSED.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 73(a),
stipulates:
"The time within which an appeal may
be taken shall be one month from the entry of
the judgment or order appealed from. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
Judge Stewart M. Hanson denied petitioner's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus on October 9, 1973,
and stipulated within the written denial, that petitioner
had thirty days to appeal the decision to the Utah
Supreme Court. A copy of Judge Hanson's denial was
delivered to the defendant.
On November 21,1973, one month and twelve days
after Judge Hanson's denial, petitioner filed this notice
of appeal in the Utah Supreme Court, Petitioner did
not previously file a timely motion to terminate the running of time, nor does the petitioner now attempt to
demonstrate excusable neglect based on a failure of a
party to learn of the entry of judgment. This appeal, as
stands, has not followed the stipulated procedure required, by law, to be followed in such appeals and, therefore, should be dismissed.
POINT III
T H E SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS
I N C I D E N T TO A L A W F U L A R R E S T ;
THUS, T H E EVIDENCE
SEIZED
PURSUANT T H E R E T O WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED IN TRIAL.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. T H E P O L I C E O F F I C E R S H A D
P R O B A B L E C A U S E TO M A K E T H E
ARREST.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-3(3) (1953), allows a
peace officer to make a warrantless arrest:
"(3) When a felony has in fact been
committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed
it."
I n State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772
(1969), this Court established the standard of reasonable or probable cause prior to an arrest without a warrant:
"The requirements, as in so many areas
of the law, is one of reason: that it be shown
that under the facts and circumstances known
to the officer, a reasonable and prudent man
in his position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense."
Id. at 261.
The arresting officers had sufficient facts to reasonably believe petitioner had indeed committed the offense.
An informer, familiar with the petitioner's activities,
told the police that he believed petitioners had committed
several armed robberies in the area and pointed out
petitioners when police investigated the motorcycle club.
The United States Supreme Court held in Draper

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329 (1958),
that when the information given by an informer is "personally verified" then the arresting officers had "reasonable grounds" to believe that the remaining unverified
bit of information—that Draper had committed a felonywas likewise true. The police officers were personally
directed by the informant to the petitioners and took
the petitioners into custody only after the informant
personally pointed the petitioners out as the robbers.
The two petitioners fit the description given by victims
of the robberies in their size, hair style, appearance, and
clothing. A car, fitting the description of the getaway
car in the numerous robberies, was parked near the clubhouse. Relying upon the personal identification by the
informant, and their own observation as to the similarities between petitioner, petitioner's car and the descriptions given by the victims of the robberies, the officers
had reasonable grounds to make the arrest. Such arrest,
respondent contends, was clearly valid.
B. T H E S E A R C H O F T H E " C L U B HOUSE" AND PERSON OF DEFEND A N T W A S I N C I D E N T TO A N D CONTEMPORANEOUS W I T H NORMAL
VALID ARREST PROCEDURES AND
T H E R E F O R E E V I D E N C E OBTAINE D WAS PROPERLY SEIZED.
I n Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964*),
the Court stated:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have a right, without
a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous
search of the person of the accused for weapons
or the fruits of or implements used to commit
the crime. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383,392 (1914). Angellov. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 30 (1925). This right to search and
seize without a warrant extends to things under
the accused's immediate control, Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925), and,
to an extent depending on the circumstances
of the case, to the place where he is arrested.
(Citations.)" 376 U.S. at 367.
The Court went on to point out:
"The rule allowing contemporaneous
searches is justified, for example, by the need
to seize weapons and other things which might
be used to assault an officer or effect an escape,
as well as by the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime. Things which might
easily happen where the weapon or evidence is
on the accused's person or under his immediate
control." 376 U.S. at 367. (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court, in Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 725 (1969), indicated that no mechanical
formula can be looked to in deciding the legality of a
search conducted without a warrant and incidental to
an arrest. Rather, the reasonableness of the search, and
therefore its legality, is dependent upon the facts and
circumstances surrounding the particular case. This
Court has applied the Chimel standard for some time.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I n State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517
(1968), this Court stated:
"The question to be answered is whether
under the circumstances the search or seizure
is one which fairminded persons knowing the
facts, and giving due consideration to the rights
and interests of the public, would judge to be
an unreasonable or oppressive intrusion against
the latter's rights." 21 Utah 2d at 274 and 275.
I n light of the Chimel
legality of the search must be
ness based upon the precise
instant case. (See also State
(Wash. 1969).)

and Criscola cases, the
decided on its reasonablefacts which exist in the
v. Gibson, 459 P.2d 22

The search following petitioner's arrest was valid
for several reasons. First, it was necessary for the protection of the police officers. Several of defendant's
friends, who might have been hostile to the police officers,
were in and around the building. Petitioner Wellwood
was actually in the room in which the sawed-off shotgun
was found at the time police officers first saw him.
(Trial transcript of State v. Wellwood and Harris,
Case No. 23868, at page 58, lines 7-9). Therefore, the
officers were entitled to " seize weapons . . . which might
be used to assault an officer and effect an escape."
Second, the officers were required to seize weapons
used to commit a crime. The victims of the several robberies had described the robber's weapon as a unique
sawed-off shotgun with a pistol-grip stock. Upon find-
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ing such a weapon, pursuant to the taking in custody
of suspects fitting the description of the said robbers,
the officers were obligated to seize the gun as evidence
of the crime.
Third, the officers, acting as reasonable and prudent
men under the circumstances, were entitled to seize the
Husky Oil Company credit card of Mortenson's Furniture. The credit card was reported as the fruits of a
crime and, as such, was evidence of the crime. To prevent the easy destruction of the thin, plastic card, the
officers acted reasonably and responsibly by taking the
evidence from the petitioner.
I n light of the above, it is clear that the officers
had probable cause to arrest the petitioners and that the
following search was incident to and contemporaneous
with the arrest for purposes of protection and preventing
a possible loss of pertinent evidence necessary to obtain
a conviction.
Based on the facts of this case, the respondent submits that the arrest was lawful and that the trial court
acted correctly in admitting the gun and credit card as
evidence.
POINT IV
THE PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION OF T H E P E T I T I O N E R S BY
T H E VICTIM WAS NOT P R E J U D I CIAL AND WAS P R O P E R L Y ADMITTED AT TRIAL.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The facts prove that the showing of certain photographs (mug shots), from which appellant was identified as one of the robbers of Joe's Husky Station, was
not a lineup as used in Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-13-37,
38, and 39, and need not follow the procedure prescribed
therein. The facts further prove that the presentation
of photographs was fair, as it included pictures of differing physique and stature. Mr. Rhode, counsel for
the appellant, reviewed the pictures and raised no objection to their fairness or admissibility in trial.
The admissibility of this extra-judicial evidence
is supported by decisions of this Court. Chief Justice
Callister, speaking for this Court in State v. Jiron, 27
Utah 2d 21, 492 P.2d 983 (1972), held:
"Evidence of an extra-judicial identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an
identification made at the trial, but as independent evidence of identity. Unlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of
prior consistent statements unless it is first
impeached, evidence of an extra-judicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the
testimonial identification is impeached, because
the earlier identification has greater probative
value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the
circumstances of the trial may have intervened
to create a fancied recognition in the witness'
mind . . . The extra-judicial identification tends
to connect the defendant with the crime, and
the principal danger of admitting hearsay evi-
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dence is not present since the witness is available at the trial for cross-examinations." Id.
at 22-23.1
I n the instant case, the witness made positive identification of both defendants at the time of the presentation of photographs and corroborated that identification
in the courtroom during trial. The defendant's counsel,
Mr. Rhode, did not object, at any time, to the photographic evidence or identification nor to the witness'
identification within the courtroom. I t is believed that
the defendants were not deprived of any constitutional
rights, that the identification was fair and proper, and
that the lower court's decision on this point should be
affirmed.
POINT V
T H E RECORD SHOWS NO MOTION
TO S E V E R M A D E B Y A P P E L L A N T .
The record gives no indication that petitioner, or
petitioner's counsel, ever made a motion to sever. The
burden to show such evidence is upon the appellant.
{Maxwell v. Turner, 23 Utah 2d 12, 455 P.2d 912
(1969).) When the appellant fails to provide an appropriate record, the court need not take cognizance
of it.
Since petitioner did not make timely objection to
1

Mr. Justice Traynor, People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal.2d 555,
559-560, 191 P.2d 1 (1948).
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the court's joining o fthe two cases at the time of trial,
it should not be considered now or on appeal from a
denial of a writ of habeas corpus.
P O I N T VI
A P P E L L A N T S A T T I R E D I D NOT
PREJUDICE HIS APPEARANCE IN
COURT.
The facts show that appellant was dressed in a civilian shirt, denim pants, and tennis shoes. This court, in
State v. Archuletta, 28 Utah 2d 255, 501 P.2d 263 at
264 (1972), a similar fact situation, held that such dress
was not unusual for young men and not necessarily associated with jails. The Court stated:
"Even if it were, it does not strike us that
there would be anything strange, shocking, or
prejudicial if the jury became aware that a
man who had been arrested and charged with
robbery was in custody and being held in jail."
I n Archuletta, this Court followed closely the decision
in Gregory v. United States, 365 F.2d 203, 205 (9th
Cir. 1966), in which it was ruled that a view of the defendant in handcuffs by two members of the jury was
not prejudicial error. The Court ruled:
"To justify a new trial this alleged error
must appear to have seriously affected the
fairness of the trial. The burden of proof to
sustain this allegation is on the appellant. The
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handling of the defendant during the trial is
best regulated by the trial court and is a matter
for its sound discretion. For this court to question the discretion of the trial court, the record
needs to show something more than mere fact
defendant was handcuffed in the presence of
the jury."
I n the present case, appellant has not demonstrated
that he was in attire that the jury viewed as "jail clothing," that such attire was unduly prejudicial to his case,
nor that the trial judge abused his discretion in allowing
appellant to be tried in such garb.
Furthermore, neither the appellant nor his counsel
objected to the disputed attire at the time of trial. Respondent feels that the matter of defendant's clothing
at trial is a procedural right and like many other procedural rights, it may be lost if not properly asserted.
Following this Court's decision in State v. Fair, 28
Utah 2d 242, 501 P.2d 107 (1972), respondent believes
appellant's failure to make timely objection at the trial
disallows appellant's assertion of prejudicial error at
this time. The lower court's decision should be affirmed.
POINT VII
APPELLANT WAS GIVEN A FULL
AND FAIR EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
I n Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1962), a case
revolving around the admission of a murder confession
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by a narcotic addict under a "truth serum," the Supreme Court held:
"Where the facts are in dispute, the
federal court in habeas corpus must hold an
evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did
not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing
in a state court . . . In other words, a federal
evidentiary hearing is required unless the state
court trier of facts has, after a full hearing,
reliably found the relevant facts." Id. at pages
312 and 313. (Emphasis added.)
The Court pointed out by footnote:
"In announcing this test we do not mean
to imply that the state courts are required to
hold hearings and make findings which satisfy
this standard, because such hearings are governed to a large extent by state law." Id. at
footnote 9, page 313. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the standard of Townsend does not apply to
state writ of habeas corpus proceedings and petitioner's
claim is groundless. But even if such a test did apply,
petitioner would still be without cause as the court's
procedure stayed well within the Supreme Court's test.
The record as a whole amply supports the respondent's
contentions that:
(1) The merits of the factual dispute were resolved in the lower court hearing.
2. The lower court factual determination is fairly
supported by the record.
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(3) The fact-finding procedure employed by the
court was adequate to afford a full and fair hearing.
4. There was no substantial allegation as to new
evidence.
(5)
hearing.

The material facts were developed at the court

The record shows that petitioner's counsel dynamically and carefully represented the best interest of his
client. H e allowed the petitioner to give his own testimony as to the events surrounding the facts of the crime
and his arrest, developed facts favorable to the petitioner, and challenged the incriminating (and ultimately
convincing) testimonies of other witnesses.
Throughout the proceeding, the court remained
open to all testimony and even questioned the witness
himself to reveal all facts surrounding the allegations
of the petitioner. (See District Court hearing transcript,
Case No. 210612, pages 2 through 7 and especially pages
11-13 for petitioner Well wood's extensive and candid
interrogatory with the court. See pages 7-11 for petitioner Harris's testimony.) At the end of each petitioner's testimony, the court inquired as to whether the
petitioner had anything further to say. (Id., page 11,
lines 11 and 28-29.)
Respondent believes that petitioner's hearing in the
district court was fair and proper in all respects.
POINT VIII
THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT
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DOES NOT EXEMPT APPELLANT
FROM FOLLOWING PRESCRIBED
PROCEDURES.
The law, in essence, is the system of order within
our society. To maintain effeciency in justice, there
must be order within the law itself. This is achieved by
the adoption of certain rules of procedure, without which
law, and society, would succumb to chaos.
Procedure should never dominate justice. This
Court relized the important balance between the two in
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16
Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965). There Justice
Crockett stated:
"It is true that our new rules of civil procedure were intended to eliminate undue emphasis on technicalities and to provide liberality in procedure to the end that disputes be
heard and determined on their merits. However, this does not mean that procedure before
the courts has become entirely 'without form
and void.' The law itself is a system of rules
designed to safeguard rights and preserve
order. This can be accomplished only by compliance with the rules established for that purpose." Id. at 409, 704.
(See also Holton v. Holton, 121 Utah 451, 243 P.2d
438 (1952).)
Appellant claims no mistake, excusable neglect,
or any other ground which has caused this Court, hereDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tofore, to liberally construe the rules. Appellant makes
no reference to state or federal laws or cases which support appellant's contention. For these reasons, respondent prays that this point be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, respondent prays
that the lower court's decision denying petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
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